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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
ISAAC J. HOLLANDS : Case No. 990375-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
In its brief, the State asserts that the sentencing judge considered all "legally 
relevant" sentencing factors, State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989), 
in imposing a consecutive sentence because the sentencing judge ordered a presentence 
investigation report to be prepared. State's Brief at 12, 21. The State's position ignores 
the undisputed fact that the sentencing judge never mentioned Mr. Hollands' character or 
rehabilitative needs. She simply relied on Mr. Hollands' prior criminal record and the 
circumstances surrounding the offenses in sentencing him. Although, the State attacks 
Mr. Hollands' character and discounts his efforts to rehabilitate himself, the record 
indicates that the sentencing judge never considered the State's arguments. Instead, the 
sentencing judge overstated Mr. Holland's culpability, relied heavily on his criminal 
record and misapplied the law. In any event, the State's efforts to disparage Mr. Hollands 
are unpersuasive. 
Mr, Hollands9 Character 
The State claims that in imposing consecutive sentences, the sentencing judge 
must have concluded that Mr. Hollands had poor character because the presentence report 
discusses Mr. Hollands' character. State's Brief at 17-18. Because the sentencing judge 
never even alluded to Mr. Hollands' character, the State only conjectures that the judge 
weighed the character evidence in the presentence report. The State concedes as much in 
its brief when it merely argues that the sentencing judge "likely" or "probably" concluded 
that Mr. Hollands had poor character. State's Brief at 18. There is simply no support for 
concluding that the sentencing judge specifically evaluated Mr. Hollands' character. 
In any event, the State's attempt to show Mr. Hollands' poor character fails. 
Even the State concedes that Mr. Hollands confessed to his felony offenses in both 
Weber and Salt Lake Counties. State's Brief at 3, 6, 17. Mr. Hollands has professed in 
both proceedings that he "accept[s] full responsibility for my actions." R. 53: 3A, 5B. 
He has not only recognized his drug dependency, he has demonstrated his commitment to 
change by participating in substance abuse counseling and working toward receiving his 
GED certificate so that, in his words, he can "lead my life in the right direction when I 
get out, be responsible and start to be a [productive] member of society." R. 52: 9. 
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The State dismisses Mr. Hollands' acceptance of responsibility by engaging in a 
gargantuan effort to portray him as a pathological liar, a dead-beat father, a socio-path 
who is unconcerned about "the welfare of others" and a hopeless drug addict. State's 
Brief at 17-18. The State's claims are baseless. The State attacks Mr. Hollands for 
giving a false name to the police and for being reluctant to confess his involvement in the 
present offense and in the Weber County crimes until he was confronted with the 
evidence against him. Regardless of the timing and the manner in which Mr. Hollands 
admitted his involvement in the crimes and accepted responsibility, the fact remains 
undisputed that he did. Mr. Hollands had no obligation to confess; in fact, he had a 
constitutional right to remain silent and to compel the State to prove his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, in Mr. Hollands' words, he "realized that this is not the 
life I want to leed [sic]," and so he admitted his involvement, took significant steps to quit 
using drugs and to move on with his life. 
The State also erroneously brands Mr. Hollands as "manipulative" for "possibly [] 
outright [lying]" at the sentencing hearing when he claimed to be participating in drug 
education classes in prison. State's Briefs at 17. The basis for this purported 
misrepresentation is a statement in the presentence report that despite Mr. Hollands' 
history of drug usage he "has never received any substance abuse counseling." R. 53: 6A. 
The State's conclusion that Mr. Hollands' lied is unfounded. Rather than concluding Mr. 
Hollands lied, the obviously more rational explanation is that, outside of prison, he has 
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never received drug counseling such as through court-supervised probation or as a patient 
in a drug therapy program. There is no basis for assuming, however, that he lied to the 
sentencing judge about taking drug education courses in prison. 
The State lodges further unfounded attacks on Mr. Hollands' character for leaving 
the scene of an accident "without thought for the welfare of others[.],f State's Brief at 17. 
In the first place, the district attorney conceded below that the other driver caused the 
accident. R. 48. Since Mr. Hollands was actually the victim of the mishap, his flight 
from the accident is not as callous as the State would have this Court believe. Secondly, 
there was no indication in the record below that anyone was hurt in the traffic accident. 
Accordingly, the State has no basis for concluding that Mr. Hollands was not concerned 
about others' welfare. 
In a further attempt to show Mr. Hollands' alleged bad character, the State blasts 
him for not supporting his illegitimate child and for being physically abusive in the past 
toward the child's mother who he planned to marry. State's Brief at 18. As is the case 
with all of the attacks on Mr. Hollands' character, the State fails to acknowledge the root 
cause of Mr. Hollands' negative behavior: his addiction to drugs. Since Mr. Hollands 
recognized his drug dependency and stopped using drugs, his relationship with his fiancee 
has improved and he has committed to provide for her and his child. R. 53: 15B. 
Specifically, Mr. Hollands has determined to change his life because, "I have a lot more 
going for me out there th[a]n in [prison]." R. 53: 3A. 
' - . A • ' • • ; • 
The State's entire discussion of Mr. Hollands' character is fundamentally flawed. 
First of all, because there is no indication in the record below that the sentencing judge 
ever considered the arguments the State raises on appeal, the State can only speculate that 
the sentencing judge "likely" or "probably" weighed the State's claims. Second, if Mr. 
Hollands' character is as poor as the State maintains, it is unlikely that both the district 
attorney and the Department of Probation and Parole would have recommended 
concurrent sentences. 
Third, the State's attacks ring hollow because Mr. Hollands' prior poor behavior 
and personal problems are directly attributable to his drug addiction. R. 53: 18B. As the 
record demonstrates, his arrests in Salt Lake and Weber Counties were a turning point. 
Since that time, he has accepted responsibility for his actions, committed to change his 
life and has taken advantage of the opportunities in prison to better himself. Despite the 
State's protestations that Mr. Hollands did not accept responsibility sooner, the State 
cannot dispute that he has done so. 
Contrary to the State's attempt to distinguish State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 
1998), that case supports Mr. Hollands' demonstrated good character. The Utah Supreme 
Court concluded in that case that the defendant established his good character because he 
"voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibility for the crimes he committed [and] he 
has expressed a commitment and hope to improve himself." Id. at 938. The same is true 
for Mr. Hollands. He confessed to his crimes voluntarily, pleaded guilty, admitted his 
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drug problem, sought out drug counseling in prison and is working towards receiving his 
GED certificate. It is inconsequential when or the manner in which Mr. Hollands 
changed his attitude and his behavior. The key under Galli is that the defendant actually 
changes. 
Rehabilitative Needs 
In a similar vein, the State contends that Mr. Hollands is not a good candidate for 
rehabilitation because he did not seek treatment on his own or recognize his drug problem 
prior to his arrest in Weber County. State's Brief at 18-19. Again, the sentencing judge 
never considered these arguments. Further, the State's claims are illogical. The State 
essentially complains that Mr. Hollands' acceptance of responsibility and commitment to 
change was not "genuine" because he did not do so when the State thinks he should have. 
State's Brief at 18. The logical conclusion of the State's position is that criminal 
defendants should be punished, rather than credited, if they take responsibility for their 
crimes after being arrested versus before. 
In support of its discussion of Mr. Hollands' rehabilitative needs, the State cites 
State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). That case is inapposite. In 
contrast to the defendant in that case, Mr. Hollands has never had substance abuse 
counseling, nor has he "repeatedly been diagnosed as a substance abuser[.]" Id. at 652. 
Further, contrary to the defendant's proven refusal to change his behavior in Schweitzer, 
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this case and the Weber County convictions were a turning point for Mr. Hollands. He 
has committed to stop using drugs and to better his life and he has taken advantage of the 
opportunities in prison to ensure he keeps his commitments. He is, thus, primed to 
address his drug problems and resolve them. 
There is no hint in the record below that the sentencing judge ever considered Mr. 
Hollands' rehabilitative needs. Specifically, the judge failed to recognize that, because 
Mr. Hollands' problems are directly linked to drugs, once Mr. Hollands' addresses his 
drug addiction, he would resolve his past problems and there would be no reason to keep 
him incarcerated. Nevertheless, under the terms of his consecutive sentences, Mr. 
Hollands will serve, at least, 30 additional months regardless of whether more prison time 
would benefit him or society. 
The imposition of consecutive sentences essentially deprives the Board of 
Pardons and Parole (the "Board") of its statutory discretion to fix Mr. Hollands' 
maximum term of imprisonment. State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244 (Utah 1995). The 
Board, rather than the sentencing court, is in the best position to "monitor [the] 
defendant's subsequent behavior and possible progress toward rehabilitation while in 
prison and adjust the maximum sentence accordingly." Id. However, regardless of 
whether Mr. Hollands addresses his drug addiction prior to the expiration of the minimum 
terms of his consecutive sentences, the Board could not release him, even though 
continued incarceration would serve no purpose. 
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The State attempts to gloss over this issue by noting that under Utah Code 
Annotated section 77-27-9(1 )(b) (1999) the Board has discretion to release prisoners prior 
to the expiration of their minimum term of imprisonment if "mitigating circumstances" 
exist. The State neglects to mention that the Board rarely exercises that authority. This is 
especially true for an offender such as Mr. Hollands who has no compelling 
circumstances such as failing health, old age or other extreme conditions that warrant 
early release. Mr. Hollands can expect to serve the full term of his minimum, consecutive 
sentences. 
Because the sentencing judge failed to consider Mr. Hollands' rehabilitative needs, 
the imposition of consecutive sentences was an abuse of discretion. State v. Galli. 967 
P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998). In any event, Mr. Hollands has demonstrated that he is a 
good candidate for rehabilitation. Accordingly, this Court should allow the Board the 
"flexibility to adjust [Mr. Hollands5] prison stay to match his progress in rehabilitation 
and preparation to return to society." People v. StrunL 846 P.2d 1297, 1302 (Utah 1993). 
Nature and Gravity of the Offenses 
The sentencing judge's heavy reliance on the nature and gravity of the Weber 
County offense was also an abuse of discretion. Mr. Hollands concedes that his 
involvement in the methamphetamine lab was extensive and serious. The sentencing 
judge properly recognized that Mr. Hollands was appropriately denied probation even 
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though he incurred his first felony conviction. However, Mr. Hollands' involvement in 
that crime was not so egregious or remarkable as to warrant additional punishment. Mr. 
Hollands' 15-year sentence for his role in that crime was a severe sanction that adequately 
punished him. The sentencing judge in this case abused her discretion in further 
punishing him by imposing consecutive sentences. R. 52: 10. 
The sentencing judge's statement that Mr. Hollands did not "deserve a break" 
confirms that the judge overemphasized Mr. Hollands' culpability. It also demonstrates 
that she misunderstood the law. As the State concedes, Utah law favors concurrent 
sentences over consecutive ones. State v. Galll 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998); People v. 
Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993). There was nothing extraordinary about either 
the Weber County offense or the present crime to defeat the presumption of concurrent 
sentencing. 
Criminal History 
Likewise, the sentencing judge overvalued Mr. Hollands' criminal history. 
Because all of Mr. Hollands' arrests and convictions stem from his addiction to drugs, the 
number of his arrests and convictions are misleading. R. 53: 18B. Once Mr. Hollands 
resolves his drug problem, it is reasonable to assume that his criminal behavior will cease. 
Accordingly, his lengthy record is not as much a concern as are his rehabilitative needs. 
Further, the minor nature of Mr. Hollands' prior record does not warrant 
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consecutive sentencing. The State attempts in vain to portray Mr. Hollands as a violent 
offender. Although Mr. Hollands was convicted of crimes that are technically labeled 
violent, there is only one instance in his entire history during which he directed any 
violence toward another person: a juvenile arrest for assault. R. 53: 8. Other than that 
offense, for which the juvenile courts declined to detain him, there is no indication that 
Mr. Hollands has directed any violence toward anyone. The lack of violence in this case 
is, at least, as compelling as the minimal violence in Galh, where although the defendant 
only used a pellet gun to rob three businesses, his crimes created a great potential for 
violence and fear in his victims. 967 P.2d at 938. 
Despite the State's concern that Mr. Hollands was arrested as a juvenile for a 
second degree felony theft, the juvenile court apparently did not regard that offense as 
serious since it merely fined him and then ordered him to write an essay. R. 53: 8B. The 
State's overreaction to Mr. Hollands' history of relatively minor, non-violent offenses is 
similar to the sentencing judge's overreaction. As the Utah Supreme Court implied in 
State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah 1986), the sentencing judge must not allow a 
defendant's prior record to "unduly influence" the sentencing decision. The sentencing 
judge's extreme reliance on the number of Mr. Holland's arrests without considering the 
remaining "legally relevant factors" such as his acceptance of responsibility and his 
rehabilitative needs was an abuse of discretion. State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 
(Utah 1989). 
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Imposing Consecutive Sentences was Inherently Unfair 
The sentencing judge's decision to impose consecutive sentences was also an 
abuse of discretion because it was "inherently unfair." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 
887 (Utah 1978); State v. HouL 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). As the State 
alludes to in its brief, State's Brief at 11, the sentencing judge essentially nullified the 
plea bargain by ordering the sentences to run consecutively. Rather than giving Mr. 
Hollands the benefit of zero to five years for a third degree felony, the sentencing judge 
ordered the sentence to run consecutive to a one to fifteen year sentence for a second 
degree felony in Weber County, the same degree of felony that he was originally charge 
with committing in this case. Thus, by ordering the sentence to run consecutively, the 
sentencing judge simply replaced the sentence for a third degree felony with one for a 
second degree felony. 
Nullifying plea bargains in this manner will have a "chilling11 effect on criminal 
defendants' willingness to accept responsibility. State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887 
(Utah 1978). Punishing defendants for accepting responsibility and pleading guilty places 
them in a no-win situation. They have no incentive to plead guilty, and if they proceed to 
trial they risk losing the possibility of a lower sentence a plea bargain would otherwise 
offer. Either way, they have little to gain and much to lose. This catch 22 is not only 
"inherently unfair" to criminal defendants, Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887, it undermines public 
confidence in the criminal justice system. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the sentencing judge failed to consider all legally relevant sentencing 
factors, Mr. Hollands requests that this Court remand this matter to the trial court and to 
order the sentencing judge to resentence him to a concurrent term of zero to five years. 
SUBMITTED, this l£± day of November, 1999. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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